The concept of magic circle : a critical reading by Petry, Arlete dos Santos
OBRA	  DIGITAL	  -­‐	  ISSN	  2014-­‐503.	  Núm	  5	  –	  Septiembre	  2013	  
	   	  
	   	   	  
36	  |	  
	  
The concept of magic circle: a critical reading 
El concepto de círculo mágico: una lectura crítica 
Arlete dos Santos Petry 
PhD. in Communication and Semiotics at PUCSP. Msc. in Education at UNISINOS-RS. 
Bachelor’s degree in Psychology, Psychoanalysis and Educational Psychology. Postdoc at 
ECA-USP, researching the theme "Knowledge production in hypermedia language: 
possibilities of the concept of academic game", process nº 2011/09778-9, Fundação de 
Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP). Researcher of Cedipp - Center of 
Digital Communication and Shared Research. 
arletepetry@gmail.com 
Abstract 
This article deals with establishing and discussing the concept of magic circle - 
often present in game studies - and ponder the possible relations with the 
concept of liminality, worked in cultural anthropology from the rites of passage 
standpoint in Van Gennep and Victor Turner and with the concept of 
transitional phenomenon by psychoanalyst Donald Winnicott. Towards that, we 
seek references in studies of the respective areas of knowledge, in order to 
reflect on the experience of play. The establishment of the relationship 
between the concepts mentioned - magic circle, liminality, transitional 
phenomenon - takes a step forward on the path that seeks to answer what 
play is and its relevance in contemporary life. Thus, given the large access to 
digital games today, this article provides a relevant contribution to 
Communication studies. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The theme of the magic circle is central to the theme of games in general and 
digital games, in particular, among other things, because it helps us think 
about the concept of  game and its extensions in everyday life. Similarly, the 
concept of liminality can be a light to  understanding online and offline life, as 
well as the idea of transitional phenomenon can be useful for a better 
understanding of the game experience. To discuss these issues, we will 
gradually bring in the concepts and weave their points of relationship. In the 
research on digital games, the theme of the magic circle is referenced in a 
paragraph in the beginning of Huizinga’s still necessary book Homo Ludens. 
Presented in the book Rules of Play (Salen & Zimmerman, 2004), the concept, 
in that context, was also influenced by the works of Apter and Sniderman, 
according to Stenros (2012). Moreover, Zimmerman himself, in a text of 2012 
in the Gamasutra gaming website, stated that the concept of magic circle was 
more or less invented by him and Salen for the book, from Huizinga (1938) 
and Callois (1958)14, but reformulated in terms of design and semiotics. 
Understood, since then, by games scholars as a metaphor, the term “magic 
circle” has suffered a number of criticisms in recent years. 
Stenros (2012), for instance, starting from the ideas of Calleja, understands 
that Huizinga uses the term not only as a metaphor, but as a key feature of 
the examples of games that he mentions in Homo Ludens. 
Aiming at a more rigorous analysis to deal with this issue, Stenros proposes in 
the same article a reading of the topic from other different perspectives. For 
some authors mentioned in the book, the concept is understood from the 
player’s personal mentality (psychological bubble of play), for others the 
concept stands as a signed social contract that creates a game. In a third 
approach, the magic circle is understood as the arena based on space, time or 
product on which play takes place. 
We will try to discuss different perspectives well discussed by Stenros (2012), 
that relate the social perspective with classical authors of Anthropology (Van 
Gennep 1909, Turner, 1974) and the personal approach of the player with the 
concept of transitional phenomenon wrought by Winnicott (1975) in 1951 and 
by a socio-anthropological reflection of Da Matta (2000). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 In this book, at least in its English translation, we did not find the expression magic circle. 
Caillois, Roger (1958): Les jeux et les hommes. English translation (2001): Man, Play and Games. 
University of Illinois Press, Urbana and Chicago. 
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2. THE MAGIC CIRCLE AS A QUESTIONER OF THE BOUNDARIES 
OF PLAY 
The expression magic circle appears in six different contexts in the Brazilian 
Portuguese translation of the book Homo Ludens, and this was also found by 
Finnish author Stenros (2012) in the English version. As the latter points out, 
only three of the quotes are brought by games scholars when dealing with the 
theme: as (1) a material or ideally marked place, (2) as a metaphor, or (3) as 
sacred space (as opposed to the play space). As this is the original source of 
debate around the theme of game studies, we surveyed the expression in 
Huizinga’s book. 
In reviewing the occurrence of the expression, we find that the first time that 
magic circle appears in the text refers to the places in which the game takes 
place. However, Huizinga warns that these “places” refer to spaces and times 
of material or imaginary nature (p. 11). In the second occurrence of the 
expression, the emphasis is on the problem of “breaking the illusion” as 
disarranging the game itself15 (p. 12). In the third occurrence it equates the 
game with the sacred, when he writes that “from a formal point of view, there 
is no difference between the delimitation of a space for sacred purposes and 
the same operation for the purpose of simple game” (p. 18). He also discusses 
(p. 45), the circular shape of the Mahabharata, stating that “the circle as such, 
however, is of magical significance”. Ahead (p. 59), however, he explains that 
“no matter if it is square or round, in any way it is always a magic circle, an 
enclosure of play within which the common different categories of men are 
temporarily abolished” in clear proximity with ritual activities. Later in the end 
of the book (p.151-152) he reworks the idea of the magic circle, and from 
there we can draw his conclusion in the form of “cheap metaphor” - as he calls 
it – “everything is play”. With this statement, in the context of the paragraph 
we believe that he means that the world really is not serious, because we are 
limited to understanding it only with reason: we’re all playing and being 
played. 
From our brief analysis of the occurrence of the concept in Homo Ludens, we 
can understand why this has generated, and still generates, many 
comprehension difficulties. Besides being in a field close to the highly complex 
game concept, we must agree that Huizinga's text is not easy to read for the 
uninitiated in Philosophy. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 This may happen owing to the action of what Huizinga (2000, p. 12) called "spoil-sport ". 
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From now on we will discuss the different meanings that this concept took, 
focusing on building a theoretical base for the study of digital games. 
When Huizinga uses the term magic circle, it is clear that he does not 
understand it exclusively as a physical boundary, but also as something that 
can be marked in ideas, as he states that these can be imaginary places, 
therefore, not delimited materially. As imaginary places, the concept is used as 
a metaphor. 
However, in other passages, the concept of magic circle is not a metaphor, but 
the name of one of the locations in which the game takes place. This is evident 
when he writes (p. 18) “the racetrack, the tennis court, the chessboard or the 
hopscotch do not distinguish themselves formally from the temple or the magic 
circle.” Well, let us not forget that the magic circle, as a spatially confined 
place, is the site of the rituals in which something mythical and sacred 
happens. 
In our initial reading of Rules of Play (Salen & Zimmerman, 2004) - if not the 
first, one of the first books that discuss the magic circle in digital games - this 
was an issue that seems to have demanded a lot of reflection from the authors. 
Understanding games (digital or not) as social systems as well as objects that 
represent social systems (be they real or idealized), in the final chapters they 
conclude that, depending on the perspective in which the games are perceived, 
they will be more open or more closed: if the focus is in the rules, tend to be 
regarded as closed systems, if understood as cultural artifacts, they are open 
systems. So, for them, the games are nonetheless open and closed systems. 
Still, for Salen & Zimmerman, despite the permeability of the magic circle of 
the game, understood as a cultural object, the game continues to be an 
artificial object. According to Stenros (2012, p. 2) to the authors of Rules of 
Play, although the boundaries of the game are fuzzy and permeable, its 
boundaries are more formal, and “the possible development of play from 
culture is not relevant.” While we consider this criticism to be somewhat too 
strong, since the authors are dedicated to arguing about the relationship 
between play and culture, we cannot deny that, as a conclusion, perhaps at the 
urging of a definitive answer, they say that the games are artificial. 
If games are not separated from the rest of culture, are they still really 
artificial? Yes. Calling games artificial does not mean they are totally 
distinct from culture. Regardless of how games can be integrated into the 
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culture, there will always be some aspect of the operation of a game that 
relies on its own system, instead of culture, to create meaning for 
players. (Salen & Zimmerman, 2012, p.102) 
Recapturing the central debate on the magic circle, we bring back Stenros 
(2012), that in his review of the literature on the subject, says that the 
conceptualization of Salen & Zimmerman has faced strong criticism, mostly 
because many scholars feel the division between play and ordinary life is 
ultimately  invalid. The author in question bases himself, among others things, 
in the criticisms by Taylor (2006) from ethnographic exploration of the culture 
of online games. Other works, including interviews and observations from hard 
core players in their own homes (Pargman & Jacobsson, 2008), have pointed to 
the absence of a clear and closed boundary between play and everyday life, 
according to Stenros. 
Although, really, the empirical evidence of the openness of online games to 
everyday life, may be an important contribution to the debate on the 
separation between online and offline worlds, we must situate this discussion 
within the history of philosophical reflections on this issue. Among others, we 
understand that Huizinga (2000, p. 11) defines magic circle as “temporary 
worlds within the ordinary world,” and makes it clear that it is not “another 
world.” Anyway, Stenros makes us see that Taylor's position, questioning the 
division between play and life, can be an important element in the discussion 
on the separation between online and offline life, and it calls for a non-
dichotomous model, in our view, that is still too difficult to build. 
However, our opinion is that, as digital games become better accepted by 
contemporary culture in general, disruptive understandings will be replaced by 
a better understanding of digital games (virtual world) as an extension of the 
material world (real). 
Still Stenros (2012) in his detailed review of the topic, brings the observation 
by Malaby (2007) on the criticisms by Marinka Copier (2005), saying that, 
while Huizinga understands the magic circle as a sacred space, Salen & 
Zimmerman transform it into a chalk circle from a child's play. What seems to 
bother Copier in the representation of Salen & Zimmerman is the physical 
demarcation between what is play and non-play. Another researcher, Sybille 
Lammes (2006 apud Stenros 2012), sees the metaphor of the magic circle as a 
simplification of play and world. 
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Some authors, while investigating Stenros (2012), have proposed other terms 
to speak of the boundaries between play and not-play, between a synthetic or 
online world and what does not happen in it. Instead of magic circle they 
suggest: magic knot (Lammes, 2006), puzzle piece (Juul, 2008) and 
membrane (Castronova, 2005). If the magic circle is the privileged metaphor in 
game studies, other areas use other metaphors such as: world, frame, screen, 
zone, environment and net. 
In philosophy it is common to find the word “world” (Riezler, 1941 apud 
Stenros, 2012; Heidegger, 1928; Fink, 1960). While Riezler makes a clear 
distinction between the game world and the ordinary world, Heidegger and Fink 
bring them together. Bateson (1955) uses the idea of a “frame” as a kind of 
mental representation that keeps the player aware of the fact that he is “just 
playing.” Goffman (1961 apud Stenros, 2012) took Bateson's frame metaphor 
to the social and cultural context, distinguishing what is relevant and what is 
irrelevant when the player plays and understood everyday life as similar to 
games. For example, when the player plays, his social status outside the game 
does not affect the play of the game; inside what matters most are the rules 
that govern it. 
In addition to choosing new concepts, we wonder: as play takes up more space 
in our everyday lives - as it penetrates the rigid structure of the world of work 
- and the production of genres of pervasive and online games, would it be 
better understood as a “mundane” therefore no longer artificial and detached 
from everyday life? We can go a little further into this discussion, pointing out 
some reflections to help us out of this mess. 
 
3. THE INTERTWINING OF PLAY AND WORLD 
Fink (1960) had already warned us that when we begin to reflect on play, we 
realize that we know nothing of what we thought we knew so well. Our 
previous knowledge appears as a “not-knowing”, as something fragile and 
illusory. As the philosopher indicates, realizing this makes us uneasy, and 
shows an ignorance that causes many people to abandon reflection. For others, 
the restlessness of “not knowing” triggers the human will for truth. For others 
still, it triggers the will for philosophy, says Fink. 
To him we can speak of two games: the game of the real, which is a 
phenomenon, and the cosmological game, one that cannot be pointed with a 
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finger, nor be subject to induction, it can only be deduced, as arising from an 
abduction (Peirce, 2005). In this argumentative logic, the actual real play 
would be based on cosmological game, or, as Heidegger (2000) said, games 
exist because we play and not the opposite. 
As a phenomenon, the game is always in the here and now. Thus, we realize 
the impossibility to access any game with a previous absolute classification. 
Remember: a game can only be called as such when someone enters it, that is, 
when a game is played (Gadamer, 1997), an issue that we work from several 
other philosophers (Petry, 2010). From the perspective of the concept of 
gameplay, Consalvo (2009) also states that a game cannot be thought without 
the action playing and goes one step further when she adds the contexts and 
reasons on which the player's actions occur. Reflecting on what elements are 
part of the game, when it is being played, also shows us a path to game 
analysis, an issue that is not discussed in the scope of this article. 
 From another perspective of games as a phenomenon, in recent history of 
digital games we have seen recurring reflection on whether one or another new 
game title may or may not be considered a game. Although scholars on this 
theme struggle to define and put limits on what games are, games themselves 
break the limiting definitions. This is what happened to the game Heavy Rain 
(Quantic Dreams, 2010) and Dan Pinchbeck's Dear Esther. Initially doubted as 
digital games, and subject of study of scholars, they were subsequently 
included in the games category. 
Fink (1960), thinking the cosmological game, uses the story of Sophocles, 
Oedipus the King, to say that man plays and is played. He plays when he 
knows more than others and, like Oedipus solves the riddle of the Sphinx. He is 
played when the truth about himself, which he had been looking for, is 
revealed. The philosopher, much appreciated by Heidegger and Gadamer, says 
that while playing man no longer remains inside himself. What does he mean 
with this? 
Be them intertwined or adjacent realities, Stenros brings in the teachings of 
Berger & Luckmann (1966) when they speak of a fundamental reality of 
everyday life in comparison with the reality of the gaming experience. They 
remember that religious and aesthetic experience is rich in producing 
transitions and in articulating the reality of everyday life with the reality of 
gaming experience. As for the aesthetic experience, we found in Gadamer´s 
Truth and Method (1997), originally published in 1960, an exquisite discussion, 
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previously announced by Schiller in Letters Upon the Aesthetic Education of 
Man in 1795. In both, the always tensioned encounters between the sensuous 
and reason is highlighted, and this encounter never ceases to happen when we 
have a [genuine] game. 
Well, history is fruitful in showing conceptions of delimited spaces within 
everyday life, that are capable of transforming social reality. For example, in 
the field of psychodrama, Jacob L. Moreno (1965 apud Stenros) proposed the 
concept of surplus reality, a kind of alternative social reality, in which a group 
can rehearse situations in the life of a participant. It is this dynamic of “role 
play” - a method used to explore unknown worlds or for the expansion of the 
self (Cukier, 2002) - the psychosocial basis for the creation of the characters in 
Role Playing Games. 
 
4. THE MAGIC CIRCLE AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, THE LIMINAL AND 
THE SUSPENSION OF THE CONTRACT 
Having discussed points that conceptually bring the magic circle and play 
together, as well as having shown how the boundaries between play and non-
play are blurred and almost non-existent for some, for others, in this topic we 
will discuss the magic circle in a social perspective, relating it to rites as 
studied in cultural anthropology.  
Klasbebers (2006 apud Stenros, 2012) while studying the magic circle, 
understands it as a kind of social contract and the game as a formal artifact of 
that social contract. In this approach between the magic circle and play, the 
author says the magic circle relates to the rules and devices that will be 
triggered when the game starts. For example: before starting any card or 
board game it is necessary that the players come to an agreement on the rules 
with which they will play. In digital games, it is part of game design, to have 
the moments (usually early in the game) for learning the rules and properly 
using controls or keyboards, an this, in our view, is equivalent to the 
arrangement of the social contract to start the game. 
According to Stenros (2012), Montola understands the magic circle as a 
metaphor and a ritualistic contract. For us, Montola’s action in bringing the 
relationship of the magic circle with rituals to discussion on digital games was 
very timely and his realization that the magic circle works as a contract that 
prohibits players to bring external motivations and personal stories to the 
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game world and take game events to everyday life, finds resonance in other 
anthropology authors, as we shall see. In this perspective, the magic circle 
boundaries would be much more perceivable than some would think. 
In order to situate this issue, we will briefly review what rite is and its 
relationship with play, as well as another key concept for this debate, namely, 
the concept of liminality. 
The relationship between ritual and play appears in classical studies in 
anthropology, as seen in The Savage Mind by Levi-Strauss (2005). To him, a 
“rite, is also something that is 'played'“ (p. 46). In comparison to a game, it 
seems like a particular and specific kind of game match. That is, the rite begins 
by exhibiting asymmetric relations between participants, and goes on by 
leading everyone to move to the side of the “winners”, complete the 
preconceived script of a particular ritual. For Lévi-Strauss, as for the previous 
philosophers mentioned above who discuss the games (Petry, 2010a; Petry, 
2010b), this is characterized by an openness and “a virtually unlimited number 
of matches” (p. 46). Although participants begin with equal conditions 
according to the same rules, in the end, we will have an asymmetric relation 
between winners and losers. Having in mind this distinction between ritual and 
play, we can consider that both produce in their participants unique 
experiences. 
Can we say the same about digital games? Do digital games also allow us a 
virtually unlimited number of matches/experiences? Some would say that they 
only allow us the experiences programmed by the machine (Liebe & Calleja 
apud Stenros, 2012), because they take the game as a closed system in itself. 
Others, when they include the player as part of the (open) game (Aarseth, 
2003) say that human experience play makes us perceive them as infinite, 
even making it the reason why we want to play (Petry, 2010a .) Can we still 
think digital games as a generic category? Or should we define the field in 
specific games or genres to answer these questions? 
We leave these questions open and bring the term liminality into discussion. It 
refers us to the name of Arnold Van Gennep and to Victor Turner's work, being 
the latter primarily responsible for the rescue and popularization of the first 
modern anthropological studies. 
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In order to describe the transition from a culturally defined state or condition to 
another, Van Gennep Arnold (2011)16, used two groups of terms in three 
stages. The first group was composed of: separation, margin and reagregation. 
The second group contained the preliminal, liminal and post-liminal. 
The first group, according to Turner (1974) relates to the structural aspects of 
the passage. Structure, for Turner and the English school of anthropology to 
which he belonged, means social structure, “a characteristic disposal of 
mutually dependent specialized institutions and the organization of mutually 
dependent positions of actors and what they imply”17. 
The second, Van Gennep applied to units of space and time, “in which the 
behavior and symbolism find themselves momentarily freed from the norms 
and values that govern public life of the occupants of structural positions” 
(Turner, 1974, p. 201.) 
The preliminal or separation phase covers the removal of the individual or 
group from a point in the social structure, from a set of cultural conditions or 
both. The margin, or “threshold or liminal” phase is the intermediate one and 
the characteristics of the ritual subject are ambiguous in it. It carries few or no 
attributes of the past, and still does not enjoy the future state. In the third 
phase, the passage is completed, returning to lie in a relatively stable state, 
and because of this, has rights and obligations to their social group. 
Individuals or groups in liminal situations “are in the middle and between the 
positions assigned and ordered by law, by custom, convention and ceremonial” 
(1974, p. 117). The liminar phase, when ritualized, is expressed by a variety of 
symbols. Thus, “it is often compared to death, to being in the womb, to 
invisibility, to darkness, to bisexuality, to the wilderness and to an eclipse of 
the sun or the moon” (p. 117). 
In the preliminal stages of the ritual, the simplification or elimination of the 
social structure in the British sense and even the amplification of the structure 
in the sense of Levi-Strauss (Turner, 1974, p. 202) are frequent. In other 
words, social relations simplify themselves while myth and ritual are complex. 
As Turner (p. 202) says: “if liminality is regarded as a time and a place of 
retreat from the normal modes of social action, it can be seen as a potential 
period of examination of the central values and axioms of the culture in which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 The book was published for the first time in 1909 and was originally called Les Rites de Passage. 
17 For Lévi-Strauss, this is not about structure. What concerns the regulating logical categories is 
the relationships they have among them. 
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it occurs.” It is in this perspective that we have found some reports of players, 
when speaking of the effects of digital games in their lives. 
When we refer to subjects, liminality is the passage between 'status' and 
positions. People in the liminal phase “are not here nor there, they are in an 
intermediate stage” and are usually represented as possessing nothing. 
Turner also uses the term “liminal phenomena” for moments that would be 
located “in and out of time.” One way to better understand this, would be to 
think of what happens in the rituals of “reversion of status” he studied. The 
individual who is to rise in status, is humiliated by other subjects in the village 
(those who will not change their status). His submission situation guards 
something sacred, because there is recognition (perhaps a sincere thank you) 
that his future place only exists because others will not leave their places. 
Turner points out that liminal situations frequently attribute characteristics of 
contamination, or danger to those who have not been incorporated into the 
liminal context. It seems that who cannot be classified, and remains on the 
border, is considered dangerous by those in charge of maintaining the 
structure. 
This reading agrees with the trend indicated by Brazilian anthropologist Da 
Matta, of focusing the collective, consisting in “taking the symbolism of the 
rites of passage as a dramatization of values, axioms, conflicts and social 
contradictions” (Da Mata, 2000 p. 12). This trend shows the positivity of liminal 
states for the constitution and arrangement of society itself, a situation that 
involves questioning the marginality and deviations beyond mere criminal or 
pathological behavior. In this perspective, the liminal moments, as pointed out 
by Turner (1974), would have the opportunity to question society itself, since 
its structure would be exposed “upside down.” 
Stenros (2012, p. 9-10) states that for many authors, as Harviainen and 
Lieberoth, Riezler and Bateson, “the border between play and non-play is not 
just social, but has also a strong psychological element in attention to shared 
intentionality” which we will discuss now. 
5. THE MAGIC CIRCLE AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPERIENCE 
Michael Apter (1991 apud Stenros, 2012) works with the idea of psychological 
bubble, a kind of small and manageable private world that temporarily 
becomes immune to the outside world. Although it might be a world that can 
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be shared, the sense that it provides is of an enchanted place, protected and 
free from threats. Being a psychological state, sometimes a physical 
representation gives it a frame, such as the outside lines of a soccer field, the 
computer screen or the controls of a video game console (Murray, 2003). In 
other situations,  words have the strength of acts (Austin, 1990) as in fairy 
tales with “Once upon a time ...” (Bettelheim, 1980). Moreover, the rules of 
the game work as idealistic builders of that other reality. 
Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi does not see games as the sole possessors of flux. For 
him (Stenros, 2012) flow can occur not just fun and games, but also at work. 
However, it is interesting to note that a feature of Csikszentmihalyi’s flow is the 
centralization of attention in a delimited field of stimuli (focus), characteristic of 
what occurs within the magic circle. 
This detachment from everyday reality - that the game provides – when it 
produces liminal people, who are in a position to be more “creative in their 
release of structural controls” (Turner, 1974, p. 5), revealed as potential for 
the human psyche, as time and space for a new structure. 
In this way, one of the interpretative trends of Van Gennep’s liminality and 
rites of passage, highlighted by Da Matta (2000), situates rites as part of the 
individual process of adaptive change of position within a social system, for 
example, the passage from childhood to adulthood. Another way to understand 
it is our need for privacy, of being at a certain distance from intense group 
activity. 
With the experience, both in literature and in computing, Janet Murray (2003), 
starting from Turner’s teachings (1974), says that computers, mice, and 
joysticks are liminal objects18, that bring us closer to the concept of liminal 
magic circle. When Murray takes the liberty of adding the notion of liminal 
subject and liminal phenomenon, what she calls liminal objects - which act as 
supports of the input and output of the game world - it may be useful to keep 
the concept of magic circle to understand the psychological experience of play.  
In Hamlet on the Holodeck, Murray also uses the term “transitional objects” 
taken from Winnicott (1975), to refer to the characters and events as “real” 
supports of what the player projects from inside. For Winnicott (1975), these 
objects are transitional because they are situated on the border between 
external reality and our own minds, offering us the security of an object 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Liminal is a word derived from Latin (limen) that means limit or threshold. In this sense 
computers are for Murray passing objects. 
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outside ourselves upon which we can project our feelings. So are toys, so are 
games and video games. 
In this perspective, the games, thought of as an object governed by the magic 
circle - while defining material or imaginary and magical space (prefer this to 
the sacred) in which differences between participants are abolished - for more 
than becoming part of everyday life to represent and influence, maintain the 
status of “non-serious activity”19, as a necessary freedom in the face of rigid 
social structures whenever required by civilization. 
However, despite the psychological experience of a protective bubble that 
enables us to live - like in a rite of passage - a transitory moment, the game 
experience does not pass without consequences to everyday life. 
As the experience of the dream, to some extent, invades our life awake, and 
our life awake is material that has manifestations in our dreams (Freud, 1981), 
games also permeate these two sides of a same structure. When we think of 
the designer, games are at the same time, social expression immersed in a 
more or less universal context and are the expression of a particular mindset. 
When we think of a player, at the same time that a game expresses a 
particular idea or proposes an experiment, it is also reorganized from the point 
of view of the player, who obtains his specific and particular experience with 
it20. 
At this point, we can already perceive that the psychological formulations, 
different from the social approaches to the theme, emphasize 
phenomenological readings. “This helps in explaining why different people have 
differing interpretations of playful situations – or even as to what counts as 
playful – as the protective psychological bubble is not uniform and shared, but 
personal” Stenros writes (2012, p. 11). From here on in this text, the social 
and the psychological will cross. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 The idea of the game as a non-serious activity appears in Huizinga when he says that "play is 
diametrically opposed to the seriousness" (p. 8), it provides, often laughter, although he also 
states that "the contrast between play and seriousness is not decisive nor immutable "(p. 8), 
because we usually take seriously the games we play. Finally, he says that "there is no room for 
any distinction between play and seriousness" (p. 161). In the context of the expression in our 
sentence, the meaning is supported on the first of these perspectives. 
20 The experience of each player towards certain games have shown to be so particular in our 
research, that it is similar to the experience with regular artwork, despite the consecration of some 
titles in the gaming market. 
OBRA	  DIGITAL	  -­‐	  ISSN	  2014-­‐503.	  Núm	  5	  –	  Septiembre	  2013	  
	   	  
	   	   	  
49	  |	  
	  
6. THE MAGIC CIRCLE AS A SOCIAL AND INDIVIDUAL EXPERIENCE 
When we think games from an empirical point of view, we find the intersection 
between the personal and the social, as games require rules - although they 
can be personal – these are generally socially shared. However, for the game 
to be possible, all participants must accept the rules. That is a personal choice. 
“Play and ritual are complementary, ethologically based behaviours which in 
humans continue undiminished throughout life” says Stenros (2012) on the 
ideas of Richard Schechner. For the latter, thinking that play is dangerous is 
absolutely central to understanding it. As in rituals, playing is to create multiple 
realities, their own boundaries and kingdoms, a certain kind of “creative lie”. 
As in rituals - when the limits of social structure are temporarily disrupted - the 
games go beyond the limits of everyday life, carrying certain “danger”21  to the 
social structure. This would be the reason why the player needs the magic 
circle: to feel safe and secure in a (mental or physical) region in which what 
might happen [in the game] will not affect everyday life of society. The fun, the 
fact of having chosen it voluntarily or of participating of an ephemeral activity, 
are psychological “masks” or “disguises” necessary to live the experience as 
fun instead of what, in fact, would keep certain danger. Anthropology has 
called this process a ritual. 
What interests us here is to understand that “during the intermediate 'liminal' 
period, the characteristics of the ritual subject are ambiguous”. They are in a 
cultural domain “that has little or almost none of the attributes of the past or 
the future” (Turner, 1974, p. 116-117). In this sense, the magic circle is a 
condition of ritual and liminal (phenomenon, object or subject) will function, 
respectively, as an event in a time or space of a subject in transition. 
According to Stenros (2012), the idea that sports and games are safe is deeply 
rooted in the field of game studies and especially in game design. This idea 
leads us to think of games as separate from everyday life, and the actions 
performed in them have little or no consequences beyond the game session. 
Malaby (2007, p. 110), for example, considered games as artifacts, to 
emphasize that they are not only produced, but also are socially constructed to 
be apart (in varying degrees) from everyday life. However, from an empirical 
point of view, some games test those limits. Not only RPGs, as we already 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 The danger in the context of this argument relates to what anthropologist Victor Turner called 
social anti-structure, a moment in which social structures are suspended and are questioned. 
OBRA	  DIGITAL	  -­‐	  ISSN	  2014-­‐503.	  Núm	  5	  –	  Septiembre	  2013	  
	   	  
	   	   	  
50	  |	  
	  
mentioned, but also the so-called pervasive games with their faint and 
expanded borders (Andrade, 2012). 
In a more contemporary anthropological reading, Da Matta (2000) makes a 
connection between the idea of liminality of cultural anthropology and that of 
individualism, being the latter forged in the mid-nineteenth century by 
Tocqueville and developed on reflections about institutions and political, 
economic and religious aspects of society. 
Individualism, according to Da Matta, is an ideological construct that is central 
to modern Western culture, which turned out to be “designed in other societies 
and cultures as a universal fact of human experience” (Da Matta, 2000, p. 10). 
As a result, the individual is a being endowed with independence and 
autonomy never seen before, to the point that he [the individual] becomes 
greater that the society to which he belongs. 
As Da Mata (2000, p.10) tells us, he realized in his studies about Brazil, 
especially about Brazilian Carnival, the possibility of relating the liminality with 
individuality, what led him to undertake a criticism of anthropological literature 
on the concept of liminality. In his understanding of Turner, unlike ours, he 
perceives liminality to be negative. We, on the other hand, understand that 
Turner (1974, p . 5 ) also perceives in liminality a creative possibility when, for 
example, he  says that “Liminal passages and liminal people (people passing) 
are not here nor there, and are in an intermediate degree. Such phases and 
people can be very creative22  in their release of structural controls, or may be 
deemed as dangerous from the standpoint of maintaining law and order”.  
While Da Matta (2000) understands liminals can be considered dangerous, 
because they break with the prevailing law and order, our reading understads 
this potential danager as an element that fosters creativity. Backed by 
Heidegger and Peirce, we defended in our thesis (Petry, 2010a), that risk is an 
element that is present and vigorous in the generation and production of new 
knowledge. 
In a Nietzschean reading, we would say that one needs Dionysus - the 
liberation from  desire and will – for a new process to come into action, but 
would also need Apollo - the order of a form - so that another possibility might 
become present. The desire or impulse leads to the search of disruption from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Our emphasis. 
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everyday life, while the transformation of the status quo will require a 
transgressive organization (as described by Turner when referring to the rituals 
of reverse status). 
For him, the emphasis given by Turner to the anti-structure23 and rites as a 
denial of rigid social structure, that is, a kind of reaction against the rigidity of 
societies, is not what best explains the rites of passage. What would better 
explain them would be the need, of the collective, of individual and temporary 
seclusion of its members. Here is how he reached this conclusion. 
By studying Brazilian Carnival he realized that it is a festival which at the same 
time stimulates domestic and hierarchic rank competition, and at the same 
time adopts bourgeois technologies while reproduces an antibourgeois 
ideological system, promoting anti-puritanism, in a kind of temporary 
suspension of social rules. In this festival, “old and routine relationships are 
loosened and [...] [people live] new identities that enable innovative readings 
of the world emerge. What helps to gain - as with the sages, anchorites, 
shamans, witchdoctors and traditional renouncers – a new and differentiated 
knowledge about society and about the person himself” (Da Matta, 2000, p. 
14). 
However, its inner construction shows a wide variety of Brazilian cultural 
manifestations of every kind (food, sexual, religious, racial, bureaucratic, 
among others) as always in an intermediate or liminal that makes us find in 
Turner and Van Gennep’s liminal not only a temporary state during the time of 
some ritual, but an experience that can be much more common in our society 
and in contemporary Western life. 
What we understand that Da Matta wants to criticize in Turner and Van Gennep 
is the motivation of the rite as a manifestation of opposition to the fixity of 
social structure: maybe society cannot in fact be so rigid, nor the rite only 
involve contestation, since it aims to restore the previous situation. For him, 
that would indeed be central to the rite is also described in anthropological 
observations by Van Gennep to Turner, is the separation of the young rookie 
the rest of society as a time individualizing. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23  Anti-structure, term organized by Turner (1974) as opposed to the structure, refers to the 
transient states in a society, which was called by Van Gennep (1909) a liminal. 
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The central thesis of Da Matta is that what truly characterizes the liminal phase 
of rites of passage is the experience of individuality (experienced as a state of 
loneliness, lack, suffering and isolation), whose end is not the removal of the 
person from the group, but the promotion of a renewed encounter with society 
in a triumphant return to take on new roles in it. Many of the myths studied by 
anthropologists say that the acquisition of important elements for the tribe was 
made by characters who have stayed away (voluntarily or not), learned and 
returned as heroes, acquiring a prominent social position : the so-called “hero’s 
journey” described by Joseph Campbell (2004). 
As pointed out by Da Matta in the same text, in the case of tribal characters, 
what is at stake “is not to build a psychologically and existentially autonomous 
being, but to shape subjectivities whose conscience cannot do without their 
mates and masters of initiation” (p. 19). Would this be the motivation in 
modern Western society that makes us focus on ourselves and praise individual 
achievement? Again, in initiation rites, the construction of individuality and 
collectivity reassert each other, and are built by the same set of values. Yet, in 
our society, individualization is built highlighting a striking interiority and is 
centered in the self. 
I want to suggest that the distinctive feature of liminality is the 
segregation of a person (or a class of persons, treated as a social or 
mystical corporation) of their social ties, releasing them temporarily from 
their family obligations, lineage, village or clan which transforms the 
individual temporarily in an “out-of-world” individual, in people without 
social ties that allow their full social classification and define, thus, their 
obligations to society (Da Matta, 2000, p. 20) . 
In this sense, to play a game, especially single players, and try this “temporary 
removal”, the experience of being “out-of-the-world”, can be (in the manner of 
a liminal experience in ritual) the possibility of the formation of an unusual and 
distinct social construct , nurtured by the experience of individualization, of 
being by yourself in the immersive environment of a game. The question is: 
can this experience of isolation better serve society as a locus of being in the 
world, as well as to be of service to the search of freedom and independence 
from others. But under what conditions could the experience of play have this 
“return to the village?” 
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6. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The first question, given the debate initiated by game studies, would be to try 
to answer if magic circle would be a valid concept for understanding digital 
games, in which perspective it would still be valid. 
Analyzing the prospects of the object under study as an arena (as space, time 
or product in which the game takes place), as a set of rules established in a 
social contract and as a psychological experience of the player, as proposed by 
Stenros (2012), the understanding of magic circle, in our view, is still very 
useful for understanding the central features of digital games (it is a cultural 
artifact, it occurs in space and time, it requires shared rules). We include - 
what is not considered by all but in the phenomenological perspective is 
indispensable - the Aesthetic experience (Gadamer, 1997) or the production of 
presence (Gumbrecht, 2010), or immersion (Murray, 2003) as an element that 
produces the magic circle, the element that “traces the circle” (Lacan, 1998) of 
the magic circle. Without the player in a given state, the game will not be more 
than digital software. In this vision of digital games, the “magic” idea of the 
magic circle disappears and has nothing to say. 
From the reflections of Da Matta about Van Gennep and Turner, we agree that 
-especially in the contemporary world- what best explains the rites is necessity 
not only of the group, but primarily of the subject (in the psychoanalytic sense 
of the term), of the individual and temporary seclusion of members. The 
isolation and solitude open and accentuate an intense inner dialogue, typical of 
modern individualism, a dialogue glorifying autonomy, privacy, self-
development, socio-centrically taken as the dignity of man, in which the ability 
to remain undivided is a sign of integrity and strength of character. 
Thus, it is the experience of being “out-of-the-world” that engenders and 
characterizes liminal states and the magic circle, not the other way around. In 
other words, liminality and its properties, as discovered by Turner, have no 
power in themselves. But it is the approximation of  liminal states of individuals 
that makes novices become marginal. It is, in a word, the individuality that 
engenders liminality. Basically, the rites of passage deal with transforming 
individuality in complementarity, isolation in interdependency and autonomy in 
immersion in the network of relationships that the ordeals, by contrast, 
establish as a model for the plenitude of social life (Da Matta, 2000, p.23). 
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Just to recapture: as we already discussed (Turner, 1974, p. 202): “if liminality 
is considered as a time and a place of retreat from the normal modes of social 
action, it can be seen potentially as a period of examination of the core values 
and axioms of the culture in which it occurs”, but it can also be seen as a 
potential time for the “liminal subject” to examine himself. 
In modern societies, especially with the increasing complexity in the social 
division of labor and the increasing specialization of society and culture, what 
was in tribal society a set of transitory qualities between states became an 
institutionalized state. With this, liminality proved prone to enter the structure 
and receive a supplement of roles and structural positions (Turner, 1974), for 
example, in the institutionalization of adolescence. With this would we, 
therefore, have lost the characteristic of “life in suspension” of liminality? 
Or was it the other way around: with the uncertainties of contemporary 
society, in which living in transitional states became something permanent, 
such as the current situation of unemployment among young people (Canclini 
et al., 2012), do we have just a constant “life in suspension”? And with the 
expansion of digital game genres that blend online and offline life, in which we 
are living in the reality of everyday life (for instance, selling avatars in World of 
Warcraft) and in the reality of the game (conquering items and overcoming 
challenges), are we constantly in and out of the magic circle? 
In our view, these two realities are giving visible signs of merging, to the 
extent that the acceptance of digital games advance in contemporary society 
blurs the boundaries between work and leisure, blurs the boundaries between 
material and immaterial, between the physical body and synthetic one. This 
means we go into and out of the magic circle more often than we previously 
did. At every time we experience the game world within the world of life and 
no longer perceive ourselves living in rigid and static structures, but in 
constant and fluid transformation (Bauman, 2007), in other words, in liminal 
states. Likewise, the world of life enters the world of the game as we carry our 
expectations, hopes and desires of our real lives to the game world (Consalvo, 
2009). As Turner wrote in the preface to The Ritual Process: 
The people of the forest, of the desert and tundra react to the same 
processes as the people of cities, of courts and markets. Revolutions and 
reforms can be studied by employing the same terminology that is used 
to study the cultural products of large and stable civilizations. 
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Despite the attraction that computers and the narratives supported in them 
have on us, players are rarely completely absorbed by the game, what makes 
the meta-communication about the game possible, that is, the game is open 
and allows an expansion out of it, generating meanings and understandings. In 
this sense, it has reflections in everyday life, although (with the exception of 
pervasive games and that “play/work” in MMOs), they do not act directly on 
reality. With this, we mean that it is no longer possible to think digital games 
as a universal category; it is necessary to study them starting from 
themselves. 
A final debt to our reader: in what does the debate on the concept of magic 
circle take us further in defining what play is? 
If we understand the idea of game as a closed system only in terms of a list of 
criteria that are necessary for something to be called a game - then the digital 
game is not what Lévi-Strauss defines as game. That is, the digital game does 
not have limitless possibilities, but what the programming and design allowed 
as possible. 
If we understand that a game in the wake of the phenomenology of Heidegger 
and Gadamer, is only a game when it is played, we need the presence of the 
human subject (player), to understand a game, since it is he who puts the 
game in action. Thus, Lévi-Strauss is right, because the experience of the play 
will reveal its many interpretive possibilities. 
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